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SECOND-HAND JUDGMENTS:
RECIPROCAL USE OF JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL
AND CRIMINAL MATRIMONIAL CASESt
GERHARD 0. W. MUELLER* and LEO H. WHINERY* *
I. ECONOMY, STARE DECISIS AND POLICY
Our title indicates, we hope, that we wish to discuss and to evaluate
the law governing the proof of disputed facts in a matrimonial case
of civil or criminal nature which facts have already been judicially
determined and reduced to judgment in a previous matrimonial case
of the opposite nature. For example: D has been convicted of adultery.
Can Mrs. D utilize the judgment of D's conviction in her divorce
suit against D, as a short-cut way of proving D's adultery? The order
of proceedings may be in the reverse.
An important question confronts us at the outset. Why should an
existing judgment be used again in a subsequent litigation? Why not?
Let us leave aside, for the moment, the technical considerations on
which theories of bar, res judicata and evidence rest, matters about
which we propose to talk in detail below. Let us first view the matter
of the re-use of judgments in the light of economy. Is it not a matter
of simple arithmetic that we will save the taxpayer (in the one case)
*Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University; Senior Fellow, Yale Law
School; A.B., 1947, Ploen College, Germany; J.D., 1953, University of Chicago; LL.M.,
1955, Columbia University.
**Associate Professor of Law, University of North Dakota. A.B., 1949, LL.B.,
1951, University of Kansas City; LL.M., 1955, Columbia University. Member of
Missouri Bar.
tWe have written this paper for two groups of lawyers: (i) counsel now or later
in need of a ready precedent and analysis lacking in the standard texts, and
(2) the lawyer who is interested in the proper and utilitarian effectuation of a
proper societal purpose by a proper legal means. The latter addressee should
read the whole of this essay. Note: The term reciprocal is not, as commonly,
employed with a sequential but with an alternative denotation.
We are pleased to note that a Case Comment, by Mr. Gavin K. Letts, Evi-
dence-Prior Criminal Conviction as Evidence of Guilt in Subsequent Civil Action,
14 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 259 (1957), has preceded the publication of this article
in the same law review. The topic, it would seem, is an acute and timely one.
The instant essay is not meant to be either cumulative to, or corrective of, the
cited comment. Indeed, we find the conclusions reached in Mr. Lett's excellent
comment to be largely confirmed by our own research. But our essay attempts
not only to view the wider problem of prior adjudication on the other side of the
court, but also to examine these evidence rules functionally and policy-wise, for
one specific sphere, that of the matrimonial offense.
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and the parties (in the other) a lot of effort, thus money, if we satisfy
ourselves with one thorough judicial determination of the crucial
facts in issue, instead of litigating the same questions over again in a
subsequent proceeding with now worn-out witnesses whose patience
may have been overtaxed and whose memories are undergoing a
gradual transformation? The second-hand car and casebook, refriger-
ator and washing machine, serve a useful purpose in our society. Why
not the second-hand judgment, especially if it stays in the same family,
so to speak? The second-hand appliance may be as good as new, but
the second-hand judgment does not wear out at all; it stays new. Of
course, it really stands for the accuracy and veracity of the issues de-
termined and it bears the good-housekeeping seal of judicial approval,
a warranty, we surmise, which exceeds that of the dealer's reputation.
Thus, on principles of economy one should endorse the widespread
use of civil judgments for evidentiary purposes in subsequent criminal
proceedings, or of criminal judgments in subsequent civil proceedings.
This stand, especially in the latter case, has enormous implications.
Suppose we come to the conclusion that the judgment of conviction
of adultery, without more, will suffice to support a divorce decree. Will
not the statistical curves for adultery prosecution soar as high as
satellites? As a result divorce costs would go down considerably,
since it is now the public prosecutor who, on complaint of the ag-
grieved spouse, has the costly task of proving the adultery, or other
marital offense, of the erring spouse, while the divorce plaintiff reaps
the fruits of the public effort.
Will it not result from such a proposal that the atmosphere sur-
rounding marriage breakdown will become more and more vicious?
Where parties now resort to a discreet and stereotyped proceeding
which involves the husband's having been seen in a hotel room with
an unknown blonde in a black and lacy nightgown, or the wife's
taking a socially acceptable and enjoyable trip to Nevada, will there
not be an incentive, especially on the part of the aggrieved spouse, to
file a complaint with the public prosecutor, whether founded or not,
in the hope of securing a conviction that will then serve as a divorce
ground? Vice versa, will not prosecutors be tempted to follow up every
divorce with a criminal prosecution? Will not such a scheme reverse
the present trend of divorce law, which is "away from the fault prin-
ciple," and accentuate fault, mens rea, or criminal guilt in matrimonial
discord, contrary to all modern evidence which tends to prove that the
attribution of guilt to any one party to an unstabilized marriage is
erroneous?
1958]
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According to our investigations there have been no such conse-
quences where the reciprocal use of judgments is in vogue.' This may
be due to the fact that the possibility of the reciprocal use of judgments
is very little known. Perhaps we are doing the public a disservice by
publicizing this mode of proceeding. But we do not think so.
First of all, the reciprocal use of judgments is necessarily restricted
to cases where fault or no-fault is in issue-i.e., where the law still
deems it wise and utilitarian to operate with the fault principle. Thus,
it does not interfere with any trend away from the fault principle.
If divorce were to be based entirely on the non-fault principle (Zer-
ruettungsprinzip-faillite-breakdown principle) necessarily there could
not then be any re-use of an existing judgment, and we should not be
sorry about such a development. But the fact is that our laws, for the
most part, are still clinging to the fault principle, and even where the
non-fault principle has been introduced, it has not replaced the
institution of divorce for fault entirely. In addition, matrimonial of-
fenses, as we define them, include matters of nonsupport, desertion,
cruelty to children, etc.-i.e., all offenses which tend to disrupt family
harmony and stability, whether grounds for divorce or not, so that
the problem of the reciprocal use of judgments will, in the foreseeable
future, at least, stay with us no matter what happens on the divorce
front.
In the second place, we do not think that the possibility of prov-
ing divorce grounds through public prosecutions will make for greater
viciousness of dealings between estranged spouses. Again, evidence of
such a development is lacking. The more commonly known reverse
of the situation, of course, cannot serve us as an example. The public
prosecutor stays his hand, as evidenced by the great disparity between
the innumerable adultery divorces and the ridiculously few adultery
prosecutions, not only because adultery prosecutions are commonly
frowned upon, but also because the prosecuting attorney lacks an
incentive which the aggrieved spouse may well have, namely, an urge
for relief from personal suffering or a retaliatory attitude. Thus, the
aggrieved spouse may disregard society's disapproval of adultery prose-
"In this connection it is interesting to note that the French Code of Criminal
Procedure (Code d'Instruction Criminelle) permits aggrieved parties to join the
criminal prosecution as civil complainants. After conviction the court may impose
appropriate damage awards. After an acquittal the award of damages is still pos-
sible if the evidence satisfies the civil preponderance requirement. The difference
in the quantum of required proof under French law is similar to that known to us
in Anglo-American law. For detailed discussion see Freed, Aspects of French Crim-
inal Procedure, 17 La. L. Rev. 730, 734-735 (1957). See also Hammelman, The Evi-
dence of the Prisoner at his Trial: A Comparative Analysis, 27 Can. B. Rev. 652
(1949).
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cutions and institute criminal proceedings against the erring spouse.
As long as our law regards certain marital wrongs as crimes we frankly
do not blame an aggrieved spouse for employing the strong arm of the
law as an ultima ratio in her defense. But in this class of offenses, as
in all others, it is the public prosecutor's function to guard against
a misuse of proceedings where private passion and a retaliatory mood
have led to an overzeal which is out of step with the community at-
titude. But, in any event, it might well be said that the possibility
of instituting or following a divorce proceeding by public prosecu-
tion can serve as an additional deterrent against the erring spouse,
although we realize that a sad marriage it is indeed, and hardly worth
saving, which needs deterrence for continued existence.
Should adultery cease to be a criminal offense entirely and in fact,
or even in law, as in a number of countries, there still would remain
an abundance of matrimonial offenses where public prosecutions
are both frequent and desirable. In such cases why should the civil
plaintiff not be permitted to use the judgment of the defendant's
criminal conviction to support his or her civil claim? Conversely,
why should the civil defendant not be permitted to use the criminal
acquittal as some evidence against the civil claim? The same should
be true if the relation of proceedings is in the reverse order. But fur-
ther policy speculation cannot proceed without a close alignment of
our discussion with the rules of law, for it was in law, not public
policy-more particularly in our courses on Criminal Law and Pro-
cedure, Domestic Relations and Evidence-that we have encountered
this bothersome problem.
We were bound to be troubled by the logic and common sense,
as a matter of legal reasoning, which seemed to have escaped a good
many pleaders, judges and writers. Evidence rules are legal rules of pol-
icy, compromising between the values of fairness and expediency, aimed
at uncovering a relative and relevant truth. Evidence rules, like other
rules of the common law, have been developed through stare decisis.
They are subject to the limitations of all precedents and serve useful
purposes only when applied according to the fundamentals of legal
reasoning. Again and again we find trial courts ruling that for the rea-
son of the difference in the quantum of required proof between civil
and criminal cases-and for various other reasons, of course-a recipro-
cal use of judgments to prove, or throw light on, controversial factual
issues established thereby is quite out of the question. As we shall indi-
cate below, appellate decisions and text books abound with such gener-
alities. A defendant layman who is unaware of any differing standards
of proof is tempted to classify the successful invocation of the above
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exclusionary rule by his attorney as a typical lawyer's trick-out-of-the-
bag, although it will appear quite silly to him that there can be any dis-
pute about what has already been established in some other, or even
the same, courtroom, and his pocketbook may already have been sub-
jected to the effects of the earlier determination.
The logician may argue that if A is larger than B and covers all of
B, then B is necessarily inherent in A, though the reverse is not at all
true. This simply means that the larger burden of proof (beyond a
reasonable doubt) in criminal cases necessarily covers the smaller bur-
den of proof (preponderance of evidence or clear, cogent, and con-
vincing evidence) in civil cases of the same fact complex, though the
opposite is not at all true. Does it not follow that, provided there is
no other obstacle, a judgment of conviction of adultery should be
conclusive evidence in a subsequent divorce proceeding, and that only
in the reverse order of proceedings should the proof of adultery
through a prior (civil) judgment be treated cautiously and with some
suspicion? Yet, courts will have no difficulty justifying by precedent
that any reciprocal use of judgments is completely out of the question.
Does the failure of some courts to grasp the (alwaysl) policy-affirm-
ing rules of logic indicate that rigid adherence to precedent may well
lead to ridiculous results, or rather does it indicate that when a rigid (or
apparently so!) norm conformity produces ridiculous and unsound
results, something must be wrong with application of precedents?
Some time ago Professor Oliphant gave us a clear demonstration
of the disturbing decline of stare decisis in modern times, and this
demonstration was viewed with alarm. There stretches up and away
from every precedent, Oliphant explained, at least one gradation of
widening generalizations. Consider this example:
"A's father induces her not to marry B as she promised to do.
On a holding that the father is not liable to B for so doing, a
gradation of widening propositions can be built, a very few of
which are:
"i. Fathers are privileged to induce daughters to break
promises to marry.
"2. Parents are so privileged.
"3. Parents are so privileged as to both daughters and sons.
"4. All persons are so privileged as to promises to marry.
"5. Parents are so privileged as to all promises made by their
children.
"6. All persons are so privileged as to all promises made by
anyone." 2
20liphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A.J. 71, 72-73 (1928). This was
Professor Oliphant's inaugural address as president of the Association of American
Law Schools, made at Chicago, Ill., on December 29, 1927.
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Or consider the following example: In an action in trover between the
owner of a horse and its impounder, the judgment was for the defen-
dant impounder. This civil action was followed by a suit to recover
a statutory forfeiture, in the nature of a criminal action and subject
to rules of criminal evidence, between the same parties. Plaintiff
impounder, a public official, sought to introduce the prior judgment
in his favor as conclusive evidence of defendant horse owner's guilt.
Affiirming the rule below, the supreme court held that a prior civil
judgment cannot be thus introduced into evidence to show the defen-
dant's criminal guilt, because the difference in the quantum of re-
quired proof would truly prejudice the defendant. 3
The following propositions of widening generalization may be
rested on this decision:
(i) In proceedings to recover a forfeiture a prior judgment in
trover against the present defendant may not be used as conclusive
evidence of the defendant's guilt.4
(2) In all cases of the sequence civil proceeding-criminal prosecu-
tion (thus also in matrimonial cases dealing with wives and not horses)
a prior judgment against D may not be used as conclusive evidence
of his guilt in the subsequent criminal prosecution. 5
(3) In all cases of the sequence civil proceeding-criminal prosecu-
tion the prior civil judgment against D may not be admitted at all
as evidence in the subsequent criminal prosecution.
6
(4) In all case combinations, civil and criminal, whatever the se-
quence, the prior adjudication against D may not be used as any evi-
dence of D's guilt in the subsequent proceeding.
7
(5) In all case combinations, civil and criminal, whatever the se-
quence, any prior adjudication, whether for or against D, may not
be used as any evidence of D's guilt or innocence in the subsequent
proceeding.8
3Riker v. Hooper, 35 Vt. 457 (1862), citing no authority other than sound
policy and common sense.
'We do not hesitate to support this first proposition by a direct reference to
Riker v. Hooper, supra note 3.
McCormick, Evidence § 295 (1954), with exceptions presently not relevant.
In State v. Bradneck, 69 Conn. 212, 215, 37 Ad. 492, 493 (1897), the court stated
the holding of Riker v. Hooper, supra note 3, in these terms.
GIn State v. Bradneck, supra note 5, the Connecticut court cited, properly, the
case of Britton v. State, 77 Ala. 202 (1884), for this proposition and then pro-
ceeded to attach the case of Riker v. Hooper, supra note 3, with a "so, in."
7Holding and dicta of State v. Bradneck, supra note 5.
8in this form the rule has finally found a resting place in the practitioners' texts.
See, e.g., 2 Wharton, Criminal Evidence § 639 in conjunction with § 640 (12th ed.
1955). State v. Bradneck, supra note 5, is cited in both sections; Riker v. Hooper,
19581
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A court may pick up the rule at any one of these stages of general-
ization. Suppose a court seizes upon the rule at stage five in a case in-
volving a prior conviction on a plea of not guilty and holds this con-
viction inadmissible as evidence. Widening generalizations may now be
built on this proposition-e.g.,
(a) always so when D pleaded not guilty and was convicted,
(b) always so when D pleaded not guilty, whether convicted or not,
(c) always so when D was convicted, whatever the plea,
(d) always so whatever the plea and disposition.
Policies tend to be lost sight of in the course of legal development by
stare decisis. Thus, should we ask publicly, as we do at stage 5 (d)
above, which appears to represent a textbook rule, whether the policy
reasons behind the rule still serve the original purpose of our first
precedent, or whether indeed a new policy may not have been de-
veloped which may be inconsistent with the old policy, we may well
get angry responses: Keep public policy out of the law. Stare decisis is
the best policy of the law, since it rests on the principle of precedent
by which every new case must be decided in accordance with the prin-
ciples of an already existing case. Has that not been done in the case
of our evidence example? Or in the case of Oliphant's frustrated
suitor?
Courts and writers have been guilty of building up gradations of
widening generalizations from originally narrow propositions to diz-
zy and lofty heights, so high indeed that logic can no longer breathe.
The policy considerations underlying the original and narrow propo-
sitions quite dearly are no longer being served by the broadened prin-
ciples. Societal need and functional realism have been sacrificed on
the altar of abstraction. The concepts of policy and logic, so much dis-
credited in the law of today, must be restored to their empty pedestals
if we want to return from the uncommon law to the common law,
from misleading cases to leading cases, from stare dictis to stare decisis.
Policy and logic are of equal importance for legal reasoning; in fact,
policy considerations can hardly proceed without logic.
The two types of cases, civil and criminal, here discussed, have a
lot in common, and we mean more than the moral (and legal) hang-
over after an immoral (and illegal) frolic and detour. In different
spheres of normativity both are concerned with breaches of legal-
supra note 3, in one. It should be noted that the sequence of broadening general-
ization could have been presented in a different order.
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ethical9 norms followable, to be followed or actually followed by
official counteraction of a corrective nature. At one time these counter-
actions emanated from the same source, the ecclesiastical courts.' 0
Thus, at such a time both civil and criminal actions existed within the
same sphere of normativity. No distinctions, evidentiary or otherwise,
could be found. It was a matter of pure chance, or, if you wish, a
lack of desire to disturb the developing symmetry of a legal system
distinguishing between civil and criminal, which eventually resulted
in the split personality, differently result-oriented (though not pur-
pose-oriented, to be quite sure), of the matrimonial action. This split
penetrated deeply. It operated on all levels, most of all on the eviden-
tiary, since from now on the criminal matrimonial action was subject to
the emerging evidentiary rules governing all criminal actions, and,
similarly, the civil matrimonial action was subject to those govern-
ing all civil actions. The policy of all matrimonial actions, civil and
criminal, we venture to surmise, cannot be said to have changed.
Yet the results achieved by application of rules of evidence which have
been carried to lofty abstractions of immensely widened generalization
must, we fear, be regarded as disturbing. The use of the exclusionary
rules of which we speak is not policy-oriented.
Need it be so? The answer is obvious for those who follow a policy-
oriented approach to law."1 What is our ultimate aim? It is, of course,
the preservation of the social health and integrity of the family and,
through this, of society and all its individual members. This the law
proposes to achieve within a framework of basic rules providing for
(i) the persuading of the persuasible, (2) the scaring of the scarable
into familial fidelity, duty, service, obedience and stick-to-itiveness,
and (3) by compensating the obviously aggrieved victim of society's
frustrated efforts to reach the aim through (i) and (2), so that neither
these victims nor society itself need suffer unduly, nor that the abscond-
ing scoundrel may obtain a windfall of personal and financial satis-
faction contra to the standards which he flouted. Which of these
objects is or should be of a criminal, and which of a civil nature?
And at what level and to what extent does the criminal consequence
OAlthough not all criminal offenses are ethical violations, we are not aware
of any matrimonial offense, in the widest possible sense, which is not commonly
regarded as unethical.
10i Bishop, Criminal Law 20-21 (9th ed. 1923); 1 Bishop, Marriage and Divorce
36 (5 th ed. 1878); and see Foster, Dependent Children and the Law, 18 U. Pitt. L.
Rev. 579, 579-81 (1957)-
uFor a recent exposition see McDougal, Law as a Process of Decision, a Policy-
Oriented Approach to Legal Study, 1 Natl L. For. 53 (1956), and citations therein.
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effectuate the policy better than the civil? Who would be bold enough
to contest that those aims and objectives, as well as the means for
their accomplishment, are interdependent and indissoluble?
It is not backwardness which caused our forebears to wash all of
the family's soiled (not to say dirty) laundry in the same brook. It
was sheer common sense. Fortunately, all indications are to the effect
that we are returning to common sense in the disposition of matri-
monial cases. The Foster Plan,12 to mention only one of the best
among many recent proposals, envisages a single family court with
jurisdiction over status adjustment, property settlement, child cus-
tody and support, etc. The "preventive medicine" to be dispensed
by such a court would include criminal sanctions for offenses hostile
to family stability-e.g., adultery, assault and battery, etc. Such a
court would also take charge over the erring minor family member.
The whole juridical complex of the unstabilized family would be dealt
with by the family judge. Such a family judge bears a close resem-
blance to the old-fashioned family doctor who once treated all medical
ills of all members of the family. (But unlike the old-fashioned family
doctor, the new family court judge would be assisted by a staff of
highly trained specialists of the relevant sciences.) If carried to its
logical perfection, the Foster Plan would rigidly provide that one and
the same judge (not just the same court) must handle all problems of
the same family. Quite aside from the informality inherent in and
necessary and proposed for such family court proceedings, problems
arising out of the lawyer's orderly and sober habit of evidentiary
norm compliance will then quite naturally become reduced to a
minimum, as it once was in the ecclesiastical court. Would it not
then be rather odd, to say the least, for Judge X to disregard that he
just sentenced Mr. D for adultery when he now has to decide whether
or not Mrs. D is entitled to a divorce for Mr. D's adultery? As a mat-
ter of fact, is our behavior not rather odd today, especially in the
typical American county where the same judge handles all cases any-
way and more often than not sits without a jury in the case of petty
offenses of a matrimonial nature?
We shall be happy if we should succeed in showing at least that for
the present, and perhaps until the true family court will alleviate our
problems, bench and bar may be well counseled to approach problems
of the reciprocal use of judgments in civil and criminal matrimonial
cases with the objective of such actions in mind. Moreover, those who
-'See Note, The Family in the Courts, 17 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 2o6 (1956), q.v. for other
proposals.
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realize the logical and functional position of the judgment type in
each of our various case types cannot be misled by unprecedents in
which judges failed to grasp these differences. If none of the texts
states the rules quite as here expressed, and if even the Model Code
of Evidence does not correspond fully to our analysis and wishes, we
humbly suggest that they may need an editorial re-examination. Not
even the often repeated nonsense can properly claim to truly repre-
sent the common law, especially if cases are still at hand to show us
the true rule. Perhaps it is unfortunate that even the true rule as fully
supported by properly reasoned cases does not correspond entirely
to our policy-oriented demands. This is due to the eternal lag of the
law behind newly developing policies or views about policies. There
is, of course, nothing which would prevent those charged with the
development of the law from initiating necessary changes.
II. EvIDENTIARY AND CONCLUSIVE EFFECT OF A JUDGMENT
Any technical consideration of the reciprocal use of judgments
must necessarily begin with observations on the two quite distinct
theories for the employment of prior judgments to prove disputed
facts common to both. One is the res judicata or conclusive effect of
a judgment; the other is its effect as evidence only. As to the first, a
distinction must be made between the use of a prior judgment as an
absolute bar to a later action and the use of a judgment as a con-
clusive adjudication of some issue which is material to the later cause
of action.'3 Thus, while as a general proposition no one would assert
that a prior civil judgment would bar a later criminal action, or vice
versa, the question still arises whether the prior judgment is-or should
be-conclusive of, or tending to prove, the facts or issues common to
both actions and necessarily adjudicated in the first action.14
Differing parties, differing burdens of proof and differing rights
to trial by jury, among others, may make it unjust always to treat a
prior judgment as conclusive of the fact or issue in a later proceeding.1
Where such considerations govern validly, the question still remains
whether or not a prior judgment should nevertheless be received in
evidence and considered by the trier of fact, together with other
evidence, to determine the truth or falsity of the fact in issue. Analyti-
cally, judgments are hearsay opinions when used as evidence of the
fact in dispute.16 Even so, their admissibility would be fully justified
' 2 Freeman, Judgments §§ 676-77 (5 th ed. 1925).
uld. at § 677.
l'Id. at § 654.
115 Wigmore, Evidence § 1671a (3d ed. 1940).
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by the exception to the hearsay rule governing official written state-
ments.'7 Therefore, we are squarely faced with the essential distinc-
tion between a judgment as conclusive and a judgment as evidence
of the facts found in the prior civil or criminal action. This is a distinc-
tion which the courts have not ordinarily made when dealing with the
reciprocal use of judgments in civil and criminal cases and they have
ordinarily denied admissibility solely on the basis of the principles
governing the res judicata or conclusive effect of such judgments.' 8
But, as Wigmore says:
"[M]ay not a judgment in a prior cause be at least admissible
as evidence when the issue there investigated was substantially
the same as the present one?
"The analogies of other rules would seem to justify this,
on principle. Many kinds of returns, reports, and certificates,
made by an official who has investigated in the course of duty,
are receivable, both at common law and by statutes.... Is not
the finding of a judge, or the verdict of a jury, based on at least
as thorough an inquiry as those other reports and certificates?
Has it not some value as evidence, even though not conclus-
ive?"' 9
Is it not odd that Wigmore must ask this question which on policy
grounds should clearly have an affirmative answer (or more) in the
law?
III. UsE IN CRIMINAL MATRIMONIAL PROCEEDINGS OF JUDGMENTS
RENDERED IN PRIOR CIVIL MATRIMONIAL PROCEEDINGS
A. In General.
The general rule has developed that civil judgments may not be
received in criminal prosecutions to prove any disputed fact on which
the judgment was rendered in the civil proceeding.20 This rule has
been applied with equal force in related civil and criminal matri-
monial cases and has been grounded on the principle of res judicata.2
1
The nature of the principles of res judicata explains the courts' pref-
erence over the official-written-statements exception to the hearsay rule,
thus retaining uniformity as to all instances of the civil-criminal se-
174 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 6, at § 1346a; McCormick, op. cit. supra note
5, at § 295-
'8McCormick, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 295-
24 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 16, at § 1364a.
22 Wharton, op. cit. supra note 8, at § 639; McCormick, op. cit. supra note 5,
at § 295; 5 Wigmore, op cit. supra note 6, at § 1671a; see also Annot., 87 A.L.R.
i258 ot933)22'McCorrmick, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 295.
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quence, although a policy-oriented choice might have been otherwise,
thus retaining consistency as to all matrimonial case combinations,
whatever the sequence.
We must direct our analysis, in the first instance, toward the courts'
rationale of the exclusionary rule on a basis of the principles of res judi-
cata, namely, that a civil matrimonial judgment cannot be received as
proof of a disputed fact in a criminal prosecution because of a
difference in the parties22 and the quantum of proof.2 3 Usually the
courts go no further than merely to recite one, or the other, or both
of these reasons to support their adherence to the general rule. Oc-
casionally they assign other and less important reasons in addition.
The courts' unquestioned reliance on these reasons for the rule
results in its application in many cases in which, it is submitted, the
rule ought not to have any application. The indiscreet application
of the rule confounds the distinction between the use of a judgment as
conclusive and as evidence, and often obscures, it would seem, the
permissible limits of the exclusionary rule.
Turning now to a consideration of the use of divorce judgments
as conclusive evidence, the first question that arises is whether the
parties do differ. Has the state, as a party in the criminal proceeding,
been represented in the civil action? It is said that:
"An action for divorce is something more than a private con-
troversy. It has been repeatedly declared [by the courts] that
the state is a third party to every divorce proceeding. This is
usually only figuratively true, though in some states the public
is actually represented by a friend of the court or divorce coun-
sel, who must be served with the complaint or petition, examine
into the merits of the case and see that there is no collusion, re-
port to the court, and approve various papers."
24
Therefore, in states like West Virginia, where by statute an attorney
may be appointed a "divorce commissioner" with the duty to investi-
gate all divorce suits, to appear at the trials and to examine witnesses
to prevent fraud and collusion in divorce cases and thereby to de-
fend the interests of the state,25 the state itself is a third party to the
-2E.g., State v. Rogers, 198 S.C. 273, 17 S.E.2d 563 (1941); State v. Downing, 54
R.I. 455, 175 At. 248 (1935).
'E.g., State v. Snyder, 157 Ohio St. 15, 104 N.E.2d 169 (1952); State v. Rogers,
supra note 22; State v. Downing, supra note 22.
21 Nelson, Divorce and Annulment § 1.07 (2d ed. 1945). See also Keezer, Mar-
riage and Divorce § 243 (3 d ed. 1946).
-The West Virginia statute provides: "The circuit court of each county, or
the judge thereof in vacation, may in his discretion, appoint a competent attorney
in each county as a commissioner in chancery, to investigate divorce cases, who
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divorce proceedings in a very real sense and must be so considered
for purposes of res judicata-i.e., on the subsequent consideration
whether a judgment in a divorce action is admissible to prove a dis-
puted fact in a related criminal prosecution.
26
Similarly, some jurisdictions in which the appointment or appear-
ance of a divorce commissioner or proctor is not provided for, or not
mandatory, adhere to the rule that the court is the representative of the
state to protect the state's interest in the divorce proceeding. Here
too the state has the status of a party in the civil action and should
be so considered for purposes of res judicata in the subsequent crim-
inal prosecution. Thus in the Indiana case of Yeager v. Yeager the
court said:
"The state is a third party to all suits for divorce .... '[T]he obli-
gations imposed [by the marriage relation] ... are somewhat dif-
ferent from those resting upon parties in a mere contract
for the purchase of a mule or a hog.'... The interests of the
state in a divorce case are in keeping of the court. 'Whenever
in the course of the trial it appears that the action is collusive
or barred, it is the duty of the court, regardless of the pleadings
of the married parties, to fully inquire of its own motion, as the
representative of the state, into such facts or circumstances, and
to act in accordance with the facts thus developed.
'27
Similar expressions can be found in the case authorities from other
jurisdictions.28 If the rule as expressed in the Yeager case is only
shall be designated as 'divorce commissioner.' He shall be a man of good moral
character, of standing in his profession, and a resident of the county for which
he is appointed, and shall, before assuming the duties of such commissioner, take
the oath required of other commissioners in chancery; such commissioner shall
discharge his duties and hold his office at the pleasure of the court, and may be
removed at any time by the court. It shall be the duty of the divorce commis-
sioner to investigate all divorce suits; to appear at all trials and examine witnesses
when necessary, and defend the interests of the state; to bring before the court, at
the trial, all witnesses necessary to develop the true facts, and generally take all steps
to prevent fraud and collusion in divorce cases." W. Va. Code Ann. § 4724 (1955).
See Harbert v. Harbert, 122 W. Va. 6o3, ii S.E.2d 748 (1940).
2 See further i Nelson, op. cit. supra note 24, at § 1.07; 2 id. at § 22.o8; Annot.,
22 A.L.R. 1112 (1923).
2rYeager v. Yeager, 43 Ind. App. 313, 315, 87 N.E. 144, 145-46 (1909). See
Mendenhall v. Mendenhall, 116 Ind. App. 545, 552, 64 N.E.2d 8o6, 8o9 (1946).
'3These include: Gage v. Gage, 89 F. Supp. 987 (D. D.C. 1950); Cannon v.
Cannon, 8o F. Supp. 79 (Sup. Ct. D.C. 1936); Ollman v. Ollman, 336 Ill. 176,
71 N.E.2d 50 (1947); Hopping v. Hopping, 233 Iowa 993, lo N.W.2d 87 (1943); Lickle
v. Boone, 187 Md. 579, 51 A.2d 162 (1957); Cahaley v. Cahaley, 216 Minn. 175, 12
N.W.2d x82 (1943); State ex rel. Couplin v. Hostetter, 344 Mo. 770, 129 S.W.2d 1
(1939); Duerner v. Duerner, 142 N.J. Eq. 759, 61 A.2d 307 (1948); Pashko v. Pashko,
63 Ohio L. Abs. 82, 45 Ohio Op. 498, 1o N.E.2d 8o4 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1951);
Cortese v. Cortese, 163 Pa. Super. 553, 63 A.2d 4-o (1949); Puhacz v. Puhacz, 55 R.I.
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"figuratively true," then the courts do not mean what they say.29 In
other words, if the interest of the public qua state in a divorce pro-
ceeding is distinct from its interest in having every case rightly de-
cided, 30 then the view that the state is a party through representation
by the court is more real than apparent. Under those circumstances,
the courts cannot refuse to admit a divorce judgment in a criminal
prosecution to prove a disputed fact in issue for the reason that the
state was not a party to the divorce action, as was done in the Rhode
Island case of State v. Downing.31 Conversely, in Ohio, where the rule
obtains that the state is a party to every divorce proceeding and is
represented by the court,32 the Supreme Court, in State v. Snyder,
33
while refusing on other grounds to admit a divorce judgment in evi-
dence in a prosecution for nonsupport, does not appear to have
committed the error of supporting its ruling on the ground that the
parties differed.
Therefore, in those jurisdictions where the state is a party, either
by a statutory representative or through the court's protecting the in-
terests of the state, the refusal to admit a prior judgment in a divorce
action in a criminal prosecution because the state was not a party
to the civil action seems unwarranted. Of course, where the state
is not a party to the divorce proceedings, it has been held properly
that the civil judgment is inadmissible to prove the criminal guilt.
Thus, in Coleman v. State34 the court held, in a prosecution for aban-
donment after seduction and marriage, that there was no error in
refusing to admit a prior divorce decree in defendant's favor since the
state was not a party to the divorce proceeding and could not thus be
bound by that decree.
Second, has the defendant, as a party in the criminal proceeding,
been a party to the civil action? If the husband or wife is the defen-
306, i8o Ati. 377 (1935), but see Smith v. Smith, 69 R.I. 403, 34 A.2d 726 (1943),
where the court said the "state is virtually a party," but otherwise cited Puhacz
v. Puhacz, supra, with approval; Bennett v. Bennett, 137 W. Va. 179, 70 S.E.2d 894
(1952); Smith v. Smith, i16 W. Va. 271, 18o S.E. 185 (1935); Wass v. Wass, 41 W. Va.
126, 23 S.E. 537 (1895)- See i Nelson, op. cit. supra note 24, at § 1.07.
)i Nelson, op. cit. supra note 24, at § 1.o7.
-See Armour v. Armour, 138 N.J. Eq. 145, 158, 46 A.2d 826, 834 (1946).
m54 R.I. 455, 457, 175 At. 248, 249 (1935). At the time this case was decided,
the rule that the state is a party seems to have been more articulate than it is now.
See Puhacz v. Puhacz, supra note 28. Thus, what effect, if any, the dictum of the
court in Smith v. Smith, supra note 28, will have on future decisions, is a matter of
conjecture.
2Pashko v. Pashko, supra note 28.
3157 Ohio St. 15, 1o4 N.E.2d 169 (1952).
r'77 Tex. Crim. 6oo, 179 S.W. 1172 (1915).
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dant in the criminal action, the answer is dearly in the affirmative.
The question is not so easily answered if a co-respondent is the de-
fendant in the criminal proceeding. In the absence of statute, a co-
respondent has no right to intervene in a divorce action to protect his
reputation. 35 In some states, however, statutes authorize a co-respond-
ent to appear in the divorce action and to defend insofar as the issues
may affect him.36 For example, the West Virginia statute provides that:
"Any one charged as a particeps criminis shall be made a
party to a divorce suit, upon his or her application to the court,
subject to such terms and conditions as the court may pre-
scribe."37
If, pursuant to such a statute, a co-respondent is made a party to the
divorce proceeding, the refusal to admit the judgment in a criminal
proceeding against him on the ground that he was not party to the
civil action would likewise be unwarranted. 38
To conclude, if, under applicable state law, both the state and the
defendant are parties to the civil matrimonial action, the rule of
non-admissibility in a later criminal action cannot be defended on
the ground that the parties are different. If this particular reason for
the rule is to be defended, it can only be done with clear statutory
or case support in the law of the state of the forum.
Assuming that both the state and defendant were parties to the
civil action, we must next consider the second principal reason given
by the courts for excluding divorce judgments in criminal prosecutions
as conclusive proof of facts in dispute in the divorce action. Does the
quantum of proof differ? Yes, of course. In divorce cases clear, cogent
and convincing proof is required,39 while in criminal cases, proof
beyond a reasonable doubt must be established. But the application
of the general rule should be subject to qualification depending upon
whether the judgment in the divorce action is rendered against or for
the defendant.
The general rule, it would seem, is correctly applied insofar as it
prohibits the introduction in evidence in a criminal prosecution of
a divorce judgment which has been rendered against the defendant as
31 Nelson, op. cit. supra note 24, at § 5.o6; 2 id. at § 22.07.
wIbid.
3W. Va. Code Ann. § 4712 (1955). See also i Nelson, op. cit. supra note 24, at
§ 5.07.
31Cf. i Nelson, op. cit. supra note 24, at § 5.o6, especially the discussion of the
res judicata effect of a divorce judgment as to a co-respondent in a subsequent suit
for alienation of affections or criminal conversation.
*3 Nelson, op. cit. supra note 24, at § 26.2o.
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conclusive proof of any fact upon which the divorce decree was ren-
dered. Any other rule would be unfair to the defendant under present
standards, since it would deprive him of the benefit of the more
stringent burden of proof required in criminal cases. Several cases
have so held,40 the most recent of which is the Ohio case of State v.
Snyder.41 Here, the husband-defendant was prosecuted for nonsup-
port pursuant to statute. The trial court, over the objection of the
accused, admitted the record of judgment in a prior divorce action
which determined that two children were born as issue of the mar-
riage and ordered the defendant to pay for their support. In addi-
tion, the trial court rejected evidence offered by the defendant tend-
ing to show that he was not the father of the children, and held that
the state had established beyond a reasonable doubt by introducing
the prior divorce judgment in evidence that the defendant was the
father of the children. In reversing an affirmance of the judgment
of the trial court by the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held
that it was error for the trial court to admit the divorce judgment
and to refuse to permit defendant to offer evidence to prove he was
not the father of the children. It held that the judgment was not ad-
missible since, in a criminal prosecution, the state must prove its case
beyond a reasonable doubt and that the proof on which the judg-
ment in the divorce proceeding rested did not have to satisfy this re-
quirement.
One may profitably conjecture about the question whether the
result on appeal would have been the same if the trial court had
merely admitted the judgment as evidence of paternity and, at the
same time, had allowed the defendant to offer evidence tending to
prove he was not the father. In other words, even in these classes
of cases where the judgment in the divorce proceeding is against the
defendant, must we still not draw a distinction between the use of the
judgment as conclusive of the fact in dispute and its use as evidence of
that fact and admit it for the latter purpose?
It may be, as Wigmore puts it, that "the discrimination between
using [judgments] as conclusive and using them as merely admissible,
is not commonly emphasized nor readily grasped." 42 To be sure, only
one case involving a related divorce proceeding has been found in
'0State v. Snyder, 157 Ohio St. 15, 1o4 N.E.2d 169 (1952); Kilpatrick v. People,
64 Colo. 209, 170 Pac. 956 (1917); State v. Sharkey, 73 N.J.L. 491, 63 At. 866 (19o6);
State v. Bradneck, 69 Conn. 212, 37 At. 492 (1897); see Dunagain v. State, 38
Tex. Crim. 614, 44 S.W. 148 (1898).
41157 Ohio St. 15, 1o4 N.E.2d 169 (1952).
1, Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 6, at § 1671a.
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which the question was squarely put to a court of record. In'State v.
Bradneck43 the defendant was prosecuted for nonsupport of his wife.
In his defense he sought to prove through testimony that his wife
had been guilty of adultery. The state, in rebuttal, offered and the
trial court received in evidence the judgment in a divorce action
brought by the defendant against his wife on grounds of adultery in
which he sought and failed to prove the acts of adultery with which
he had charged his wife in the criminal proceeding. The trial court,
in its charge, told the jury that while such judgment was not to be
considered conclusive evidence in the case, it ought to be given serious
consideration. In holding that the trial court committed prejudicial
error in admitting the judgment, the Supreme Court said that the er-
ror was not relieved by the court's instruction to the jury to the effect
that the evidence was not conclusive; that a judgment is either conclus-
ive or it is nothing, otherwise there would be no means by which the
court could measure and determine its effect. But such a view ignores
the plain distinction which can and ought to be made between the con-
clusive effect of a judgment and its admissibility in evidence as a
fact to be considered in light of the other evidence offered to deter-
mine the disputed issue. Certainly, one cofild not say, for example, if the
trial court in the Snyder case had admitted the divorce judgment in
evidence, and permitted the defendant to offer rebuttal evidence of
nonpaternity, that the judgment was being given a conclusive effect.
At most, it would have been prima facie evidence of the fact of pater-
nity which would have had the effect of requiring the defendant to
produce evidence showing his innocence thereof.
What should be the rule where there is a finding in favor of the
defendant in the divorce proceeding? If, on account of the difference
in proof, it is proper and fair to exclude a divorce against the defen-
dant as conclusive of the disputed issue in the criminal prosecution,
must it not follow, providing the parties are the same, that a finding
of defendant's innocence in a divorce proceeding should be admissible
in the defendant's behalf as conclusive of the disputed face since,
if he cannot be found guilty by clear and satisfactory evidence, how can
he possibly be found guilty of the criminal offense beyond a reasonable
doubt? In the few cases found where this element has been present
the courts have not even considered this question and have consist-
ently adhered to the rule that civil judgments are inadmissible in
criminal prosecutions. Of these, three have expressly cited, as among
469 Conn. 212, 37 Ad. 492, 43 L.RA. 620 (1897).
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their reasons, that the quantum of proof differs.44 The others have
merely refused to admit the prior judgments, although the result can
possibly be sustained on other grounds.
45
What clearer example could be adduced to demonstrate the mis-
use of precedent, or the use of an unprecedent? A rule stemming from
a narrow precedent-i.e., restricted to a finding of the divorce ground,
was stated too broadly. It was phrased in terms of a higher abstraction
and thus misled the courts to use it for another narrow case category
not identical with the rule-creating precedent, but encompassed by
the broadened abstraction. Such errors could not occur if judges would
examine whether the abstraction expressed by the rule of a precedent
is functionally consonant with the policy which the abstraction-creating
precedent sought to achieve. Here, quite clearly this had not been done.
The most recent case is State v. Rogers,46 decided in South Caro-
lina in 1941. It is of particular interest because the majority of the
court went to considerable length in considering the admissibility of
civil divorce judgments in criminal prosecutions, even though the
point was not necessary for a determination of the case. The defendant
was prosecuted for nonsupport and the trial court admitted a di-
vorce decree determining defendant's non-liability for support. He was
acquitted and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the state
had no right to appeal from a judgment of acquittal. The court went
on, however, to say that the trial court had erred in admitting the
divorce judgment since the parties in the two different actions were
not the same and the burden of proof differed. For the reasons already
given, it is submitted that the court erred in relying upon the difference
in proof as a valid reason for concluding that the divorce decree was
inadmissible as conclusive proof of his innocence to the charge of
nonsupport,47 since the burden of proof in criminal prosecutions is
greater than in civil actions. In State v. Rogers, however, the court
was actually confronted with "preponderance" evidence, sufficient to
overcome certain presumptions in criminal cases-i.e., in this case the
burdens of proof were actually identical in both the civil and the
"State v. Rogers, 198 S.C. 273, 17 S.E.2d 563 (1941); State v. Downing, 54 R.I. 455'
175 At. 248 (1935); Coleman v. State, 77 Tex. Grim. 6oo, 179 S.W. 1172 (1915).
'-See Commonwealth v. Simmons, 165 Mass. 356, 43 N.E. 11o (1896); Bell v.
State, 65 Fla. 505, 62 So. 654 (1913).
40198 S.C. 273, 17 S.E.2d 563 (1941).
OThe concurring judge thought the case presented an exception to the gen-
eral rule of non-admissibility. 198 S.C. at 278-79, 17 S.E.2d at 565. He did not
elaborate on the nature of the exception, though it seems that he was alluding to
the exception which permits the use of a judgment to prove status.
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criminal proceeding.4 8 No statutory or case authority has been found
covering the status of the state as a party to divorce actions in South
Carolina. If, as intimated in the opinion of the court, the state was not a
party to the divorce action, then the view of the majority of the court
seems correct, so far as the conclusive effect of the divorce judgment
is concerned, for the reason that the parties differed. But the divorce
judgment should nevertheless have been admissible as evidence of
the criminal offense charged. This distinction was recognized by the
majority of the court, but not applied, since it concluded that in either
case the principles controlling res judicata or conclusive effect of the
judgment prevented its use in the criminal prosecution.
B. Exceptions to the General Rule.
There are certain well defined exceptions to the over-generalized
rule that prior civil judgments are not admissible in criminal prose-
cutions and these exceptions have been applied in the domestic rela-
tions area. In the first place, a judgment is always admissible as con-
clusive of the fact of its existence and rendition.
49
Second, in order to establish status, when that is material, the
judgment of a civil domestic relations suit may be introduced in a
criminal prosecution. For example, in prosecutions for bigamy, the
state may introduce a decree divorcing the accused from his former
wife, rendered after the alleged bigamous marriage took place, to prove
that the wife was living and married to the defendant at the time of
the alleged bigamous marriage. 50 Conversely, the defendant may also
introduce a divorce decree to show his single status prior to an alleged
bigamous marriage.51 But, even with this exception, at least one court
has confused the application of the exclusionary rule and prohibited
the introduction into evidence of a civil domestic relations judgment.5
2
According to Freeman, divorce judgments constitute conclusive proof
4SNote the opinion of the concurring judge on this point: ".... the measure of
proof is the same, since in this criminal prosecution, the respondent had to es-
tablish 'just cause or 'excuse' by the preponderance or greater weight of the testi-
mony, as he did in the civil actions." 198 S.C. at 297, 17 S.E.2d at 656.
4OState v. Goodrich, 14 W. Va. 834, 848-49 (1878). See also 2 Freeman, op. cit.
supra note 13, at § 655.
iState v. Ashley, 37 Ark. 403 (1881). For similar cases see State v. McClelland,
152 Iowa 704, 133 N.W. iii (gii); Oliver v. State, 7 Ga. App. 695, 67 S.E. 886 (igio);
Pontier v. State, 107 Md. 384, 68 Ad. 1o59 (19o8); cf. Adkisson v. State, 34 Tex.
Crim. 296, 30 S.W. 357 (1895).
'lCommonwealth v. Lucas, 158 Mass. 81, 32 N.E. 1033 (1893). See Halbrook v.
State, 34 Ark. 511 (1879); State v. Goodrich, 14 W. Va. 834 (1878).
2Martin v. State, 19 Ala. App. 251, 96 So. 734 (1923).
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of the question of status.53 However, the decisions do not appear to
support any such categorical conclusion. One court has held that such
judgments constitute prima facie evidence of status,54 while other
courts, though holding them admissible, are silent on the weight such
judgments should receive.55 Since a decree of divorce, as affecting the
status of the parties, is regarded as a judgment in rem, the better view
is that it should be given a res judicata or conclusive effect in the
criminal prosecution.56
Third, purely collateral questions which do not bear upon the
guilt or innocence of the defendant in the criminal prosecution may
be proved by a civil domestic relations judgment. For example, such
judgments may be offered to establish the competency of a witness to
testify against the defendant,57 to establish the identity of persons,58
and other collateral matters.59 Here, however, the judgments should
not be used as conclusive of the facts in dispute unless the usual re-
quirements of a judgment as an estoppel are met, that is, identity in
parties and proof.
IV. USE IN CIVIL MATRIMONIAL PROCEEDINGS OF JUDGMENTS
RENDERED IN CRIMINAL MATRIMONIAL PROCEEDINGS
A. In General.
We are not concerned with judgments in criminal prosecutions
which are, in themselves, grounds for divorce. Thus, in forty-five
American jurisdictions conviction and imprisonment for a felony is
a ground for divorce.60 In such a case, the judgment would necessar-
m2 Freeman, op. cit. supra note 13, at § 658.
1AState v. Ashley, 37 Ark. 403 (1881).
rSee cases cited at notes 50 and 51 supra.
"'12 Freeman, op. cit. supra note 13, at § 9o6.
nState v. Dixson, So Mont. 18l, 26o Pac. 138 (1927).
r5State v. Herren, 173 N.C. 8oi, 92 S.E. 596 (1917).
'Divorce decree admissible in evidence in Coy v. State, 75 Tex. Grim. 85,
171 S.W. 221 (1914), to show lack of diligence of defendant in ascertaining the
fact of divorce from previous wife; in State v. Hendrix, 87 Mo. App. 17, 25 (1901),
to show "the intention of the defendant to get rid of his wife entirely instead of
to support her as he swears he always meant to do"; and in Commonwealth v.
Ham, 156 Mass. 485, 31 N.E. 639 (1892), to rebut the husband's evidence of his
wife's misconduct, used as a defense in the prosecution of the husband for non-
support.
cOAlabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Vir-
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ily be admissible in the divorce action to establish the divorce ground.
Rather, we are here concerned with the use of criminal judgments in
matrimonial proceedings to prove disputed facts on which the judg-
ment was rendered in the criminal proceeding.
The general rule is stated by Wharton as follows:
"A judgment rendered in a criminal action, when offered in
a civil action to establish the facts upon which it was rendered,
is not admissible as evidence of such facts."'61
Conversely, the Model Code of Evidence rule 521, provides:
"Evidence of a subsisting judgment adjudging a person
guilty of a crime or a misdemeanor is admissible as tending
to prove the facts recited therein and every fact essential to
sustain the judgment.
'62
So far as matrimonial cases are concerned, neither source can be said
to reflect the existing law. However, the proposed Model Code rule,
while bold and contrary to the weight of authority, seems generally
correct in principle.
B. Admissibility Based on Nature of Plea and Disposition.
An analysis of this phase of our subject requires us to distinguish
between four major case types of pleas and dispositions-i.e., where
the defendant, in the criminal action, pleads: (i) nolo contendere with
leave of court; (2) guilty and is convicted; (3) not guilty and is con-
victed; and (4) not guilty and is acquitted.
(i) Pleas of Nolo Contendere. Since it is a significant characteris-
tic of such a plea that it admits guilt for purposes of this criminal
proceeding only and that therefore it cannot be used against the
defendant as an admission in a subsequent civil litigation involving
the same issues, 63 the admission of a judgment based upon such a
plea as conclusive proof of, for example, a ground of divorce, would
destroy any effect that such a plea would otherwise have. In the North
Carolina case of Briggs v. Briggs64 the court held that a criminal judg-
ginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming, Alaska, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Puerto Rico,
Virgin Islands. Mackay, Marriage and Divorce 69 (2d ed. 1955).
'2 Wharton, op. cit. supra note 8, at § 640.
OModel Code of Evidence rule 521 (1942). Compare, however, rule 63 (20) of
the Uniform Rules of Evidence which limits admissibility to judgments of con-
viction for felony. Handbook, Nat'l Conf. of Comm. on Uniform State Laws 206
(1953)-
6'Abbot, Criminal Trial Practice 153 (4th ed. 1939); Puttkammer, Administra-
tion of Criminal Law 172 (1953).
"215 N.C. 78, 1 S.E.2d 118 (1939).
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ment in a nonsupport action based on a plea of nolo contendere was
not res judicata-or conclusive-of the defendant's right to support
pending the litigation in a subsequent divorce action. On the other
hand, there is one decision from which it may be inferred that a crim-
inal judgment based on such a plea was not to be regarded as evi-
dence at all in the matrimonial proceedings. 65 If the court in this case
meant that such a judgment has no evidentiary value whatsoever, then
the decision seems clearly wrong. Even a judgment based upon a plea
of nolo contendere should have some value as evidence, because it is
quite clear that this plea has always been understood as merely pre-
venting its use as an admission in subsequent proceedings. Nothing
has ever been said to extend this restriction to other rules of admis-
sibility-i.e., the admissibility of the judgment under the official-
written-statements exception to the hearsay rule.66 This is the view
taken in the comments to Model Code rule 521 and it seems sound in
principle.67 In such a case, the defendant is not foreclosed, in the di-
vorce proceeding, from disputing any evidential value which the crim-
inal judgment based upon his plea of nolo contendere might have.
(2) Convictions Based on Pleas of Guilty. The record in a crim-
inal case showing a plea of guilty may be introduced in a civil pro-
ceeding growing out of the same offense, but the record in such cases
is ordinarily not admitted as a judgment establishing the fact.6s
Rather, it is admitted as a confession or admission of the defendant in
the criminal prosecution.69 Wharton correctly treats this as an ex-
6See Wright v. Wright, 98 N.J. Eq. 528, 131 AtI. 94 (1925). In this case the
judgment was inadmissible for the additional reason that the offenses were not
identical-i.e., keeping a disorderly house; adultery. See also Johnson v. Johnson, 78
N.J. Eq. 507, So Ad. 119 (1911), but non vult plea held admissible to discredit de-
fendant.
c3It might be argued that when the plea of nolo contendere was developed,
with a certain policy in mind, one thought of total prohibition of its use in a
subsequent civil proceeding. The mention of "as an admission" merely indicated
the fact that any other basis of possible admissibility was not recognized. This may
well be so. A long overdue reform of the plea will have to address itself to the
problem on policy grounds.
07See Model Code of Evidence rule 521 (1942), and comments thereto.
61 Wharton, op. cit. supra note 8, at § 636.
6See cases cited at 2 Wharton, op. cit. supra note 8, at § 636. For divorce cases
see Ralston v. Ralston, 6 Terry (45 Del.) 505, 72 A.2d 441 (195o); Stewart v. Stewart,
93 N.J. Eq. 1, 114 At. 851 (1921); Burgess v. Burgess, 47 N.H. 395 (1867). Note:
Wharton uses the phrase "admission against interest." Admissions must be clearly
distinguished from declarations against interest. It is beyond the scope of this
paper to consider the distinctions between these two exceptions to the hearsay
rule, but it should be emphasized that here we are concerned with admissions,
and not declarations against interest. For discussion of the differences see Mc-
Cormick, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 24o . Also, for the distinction between con-
fessions and admissions see id. at § 113.
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ception to the general rule. Likewise, he finds support in a majority
of the cases-including divorce cases-for his explanation of the evi-
dentiary character of such a judgment. It is to be observed, however,
that the admissibility of the record might more understandably be
sustained on the ground that the criminal judgment establishes the
fact admitted by the accused and hence, that it is admissible as an
adjudication thereof, rather than as an admission. This point was
plainly stated in the New Jersey case of Tucker v. Tucker as follows:
"The evidential value of a verdict of guilty after trial and
one on a plea of guilty differs only in degree of persuasiveness.
It is the record of the conviction, which attests the fact of the
commission of the crime, that is of probative force and influ-
ence."
70
This theory of admissibility is not suggested as a mere quibble; rather,
it is believed that a more uniformly harmonious application of the
reciprocal use of judgments in criminal and civil matrimonial cases
would result. It is true that it is primarily the plea and admission of
the accused which establishes his guilt. But it is the judgment of the
court on the defendant's plea which constitutes the adjudication of
the fact of guilt, and it should be given that status for purposes of
proving such facts when called in question in subsequent matrimon-
ial proceedings.
71
In any event, in divorce actions based on such grounds as assault,
72
adultery,73 and the like, records of criminal proceedings containing
judgments of conviction based on pleas of guilty are admissible in
evidence to prove the ground of divorce by the admission through
plea of the defendant's guilt. Similarly, the record showing a plea of
guilty to the criminal charge of adultery is admissible in a subsequent
civil action against the defendant for criminal conversation.7 4
What evidentiary value do such records or judgments have? In
an early Maine case, the court held that a record showing a plea of
guilty to an information for assault and battery was admissible only
as evidence in a libel for divorce by the wife against the husband.
75
Later decisions support this holding.76 Such evidence is not treated
"Oioi N.J. Eq. 72, 73, 137 Atl. 404, 405 (1927).
"'Compare Model Code of Evidence rule 5.2 (1942).
12BradIey v. Bradley, ii Me. 367 (1834).
73Burgess v. Burgess, 47 N.H. 395 (1867); Stewart v. Stewart, 93 N.J. Eq. 1,
114 AtI. 851 (1921); Ralston v. Ralston, 6 Terry (45 Del.) 305, 72 A.2d 441 (1950).
7'Jones v. Cooper, 97 Iowa 735, 65 N.W. iooo (1896).
-5Bradley v. Bradley, 11 Me. 367 (1834).
,'See cases cited at notes 73-74 supra.
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as conclusive. It can be argued that the conclusive effect of such evi-
dence should be avoided for fear of misuse of the guilty plea by one
of the spouses to obtain a collusive divorce, inconsistent with the
state's interest in the preservation of the marriage tie.77 For this rea-
son, some courts have required corroborating evidence of the fact
admitted by the guilty plea.7 8 This argument seems rather weak, at
best. Actually it constitutes a supposition entirely inconsistent with
our knowledge of human behavior. In the words of one court:
"The plea of guilty to an indictment for a crime must be
regarded as much less open to the suspicion of collusion or in-
sincerity than ordinary confessions, inasmuch as it must be fol-
lowed by punishment."79
Indeed, in at least two cases, the record of a criminal conviction
based on a plea of guilty, while not given a conclusive effect, was
accorded great weight. Thus, while the court in Stewart v. Stewart,80
a New Jersey case, called it "substantive evidence," it concluded that
the prior plea of guilty to an adultery charge was sufficient to prove
the fact in the divorce suit and therefore supported the decree of di-
vorce. The court said:
"While it is an inflexible rule in this state that a divorce will
not be granted upon the uncorroborated testimony or admission
of a party to the suit, yet the admission in a plea of guilty, made
on arraignment for adultery in a criminal court, is made under
the sanction of the law and the protection of the judge. It
cannot be presumed to be procured by the husband's coer-
cion, . . nor can it be presumed to have been made through
collusion with the other spouse; and this is the more apparent
when we know that by interposing such a plea the defendant
at once puts himself in the situation of being liable to a sentence
of fine or imprisonment or both. And in the case before me the
woman was actually sentenced and served a term of imprison-
ment.
"Collusion in the law of divorce includes any agreement be-
tween the parties as a result of which no defense shall be made
to the dissolution of the marriage tie which would not other-
wise be dissolved. I conclude, therefore, that the admission of
adultery in the plea of guilty in the criminal court was not the
result of coercion or collusion, and it is not an admission or con-
fession having no evidential effect, but, on the contrary, is one
7See Burgess v. Burgess, 47 N.H. 395 (1867).
7Jbid.
'*Ibid.
'093 N.J. Eq. 1, 114 Ad. 851 (1921).
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which is substantially evidential against the defendant who
made it."81
Should the fact determined in the criminal prosecution have a con-
clusive effect? Take first the prevailing rationale that the record of
conviction is received, not as a judgment establishing the fact of
guilt, but rather as an admission by the defendant of the facts con-
fessed by his plea. Since a defendant may give evidence explaining
his reasons for a plea of guilty where the record is introduced as an
admission in other types of subsequent proceedings,8 2 such an admis-
sion might likewise be viewed as not estopping the defendant in a
subsequent civil matrimonial proceeding from showing that, notwith-
standing such confession and conviction, he was not guilty of the
facts alleged.
83
Or, consider the suggested rationale that it is the judgment,
not the plea, which is of probative force in the matrimonial proceed-
ing. Again, it seems such evidence could not be regarded as con-
clusive proof, since in this case-as well as in the three other situa-
tions involving the use of criminal judgments in civil matrimonial
actions-the parties are not identical. While the defendant in a divorce
suit and the state (if a party to the divorce proceeding under the par-
ticular state law) would be parties to the criminal proceeding, the
plaintiff would not.8 4 Therefore, the judgment would not be con-
clusive proof of the disputed fact in the divorce proceeding since it
could not be used against a party to the criminal action in favor of one
who would not be bound by that judgment.8 5
While this is a sound legalistic conclusion, it does, of course, not
correspond to patterns of human behavior. One may ask which is
the more important consideration in the identity-of-parties require-
ment of res judicata, against whom the defendant suffered a certain
defeat, or that he suffered a certain defeat? (And so it is in the case
of victory.) While we do not propose a change in this respect at
this time, it is proper to keep this consideration in mind, especially
when the identity-of-the-parties requirement is carried to the opposite
extreme of excluding evidence of conviction where the party seek-
8193 N.J. Eq. at 4, 114 Ad. at 852; see also Ralston v. Ralston, 6 Terry (45 Del.)
305, 72 A.2d 41 (1950).82McCormick, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 242, note 32. This is obviously not easy
for the defendant and such cases are highly exceptional.
,"2 Freeman, op. cit. supra note 13, at § 655.
s"For discussion of the state's party role in divorce actions see text at note
24 supra.
s1i Freeman, op. cit. supra note 13, at § 407; Annot., 31 A.L.R. 261, 269 (1924).
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ing admission of the judgment was the principal witness, subject
to cross-examination by defendant, in the prior criminal proceeding86
The law is here confronted with a clash of competing policies which
it has been unable to properly resolve so far.
(3) Convictions Based on Pleas of Not Guilty. Although a majority
of jurisdictions are still on record as adhering to the rule excluding
criminal convictions as evidence in civil cases, the trend is in favor of
the admissibility of such convictions and indicates that many of our
courts, when called upon to do so, would today rule in favor of admis-
sibility.8 7 In the matrimonial field, cases unqualifiedly in favor of ad-
missibility, decided either by case law88 or by statute,8 9 are still rare.
In some jurisdictions the courts have endeavored to qualify the ad-
missibility of prior convictions in either of two ways: the record
of a party's conviction will be received after his default in the di-
vorce proceeding;90 or the prior conviction is not admissible where
6"See note gi infra.
6Annot., x8 A.L.R.2d 1287, 1299 (1951).
';The rule seems to have been applied first in Maine. Anderson v. Anderson,
4 Greenl. (Me.) 100 (1826), though subsequently it was modified by the Maine court;
see notes go and gi infra. The Ohio and Pennsylvania courts likewise have ad-
hered to this practice since early times. See Wilson v. Wilson, Wright (Ohio) 128
(1832); Carey v. Carey, 25 Pa. Super. 223 (19o4). Other courts have adopted the
rule more recently-e.g., Wald v. Wald, 161 Md. 493, 159 At. 97 (1932), where H's
conviction of desertion and nonsupport, also ordering him to make payments to W,
was held convincing evidence in a subsequent divorce action for desertion.
A considerable liberality may be observed in English cases: In O'Toole v.
O'Toole, 42 T.L.R. 245 (1926), H's perjury conviction for swearing that he never
had had intercourse with respondent was held admissible in a subsequent divorce
proceeding as prima facie evidence, justifying the divorce decree. In Virgo v. Virgo,
69 L.T.R. (N.s.) 460 (1893), a conviction for attempting to carnally know a
daughter, rendered on an indictment for rape, was held admissible in a subsequent
divorce action to prove incestuous adultery as a divorce ground. That goes a little
too farl The conviction was for a crime not requiring penetration, an essential
of adultery.
The rule of admissibility has been recognized in quasi-criminal cases-e.g., where
H in a quasi-criminal proceeding was ordered to post a peace bond, the judgment
was admitted in a later divorce proceeding as tending to prove cruelty, as a di-
vorce ground, committed against W. White v. White, io6 W. Va. 68o, 146 S.E. 720
(1929); Rice v. Rice, 88 W. Va. 54, 1o6 S.E. 237 (1921). A similar judgment was even
held to be a bar in Vanleer v. Vanleer, x3 Pa. 211 (185o); cf. McDaniel v. McDaniel,
175 Va. 402, 9 S.E.2d 360 (1940). By the same token, judgments in quasi-criminal
proceedings, ordering H to pay W's maintenance, or to post bond, have been held
admissible in W's defense to H's divorce action, Bauder's Appeal, 115 Pa. 480, 10
At. 41 (1887); or in defense of W's heirs to surviving H's action, claiming an
estate by the curtesy in land of which W died seised, Bealor v. Hahn, 132 Pa. 242,
19 At. 74 (189o); see Bealor v. Hahn, 117 Pa. 169, 11 Atl. 776 (1887).
OAs to which see text at note ioi infra.
"ORandall v. Randall, 4 Greenl. (Me.) 326 (1826); Tucker v. Tucker, ioi N.J.
Eq. 72, 137 Atl. 404 (1927).
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the conviction was obtained upon the testimony of the person in whose
favor the judgment of conviction is offered in the divorce case. 91 Qual-
ifications such as these, while perhaps affecting the weight to be ac-
corded the judgment as evidence, should not affect its admissibility.
So far as we have been able to ascertain, there is only one case
which flatly holds that a prior criminal conviction is not admissible
in a divorce proceeding. This is the Massachusetts decision of Silva v.
Silva.92 Here, the husband sued his wife for a divorce on the ground
of desertion. The wife, in defense, offered in evidence a criminal con-
viction of the husband for nonsupport. In holding that the judgment
was not admissible, the court said:
"We think that the 'traditional rule' by which 'a defendant con-
victed of crime is entitled to re-try the question whether he
actually committed the crime, when that issue arises in a civil
proceeding to which the Commonwealth is not a party' ... must
be deemed to be law in this jurisdiction.... 'The judgment is
effectual only between those upon whom its operation is mutual,
and therefore he against whom it can in no respect be enforced
is not permitted to use it for his own benefit or to the prejudice
and disadvantage of his adversary.' ,9
The court failed to distinguish between the evidentiary and the con-
clusive effect of a judgment. Had it done so, it would have been un-
necessary to consider the admissibility of the judgment based on the
principles of res judicata or estoppel. Admittedly, the judgment could
not be used as conclusive proof since, quite aside from any supposed
difference in the degree of proof, the defendant-wife was not a party
to the criminal action and hence, not being bound by the judgment
in that action, could not take advantage of it.94 But this has nothing
whatsoever to do with the admissibility of the judgment as evidence of
the fact sought to be proved in the divorce proceeding.
On the matter of the difference in the standard of proof we would
like to refer to a prime example of a case lacking logic, incidentally
not a matrimonial case. In Interstate Dry Goods Stores v. Williamson,95
the court held that the record of a conviction of the defendant for
larceny was not competent evidence in a civil suit against him to re-
cover the value of the stolen property. In addition to giving the rea-
son that the parties differed in the two proceedings, the court also
OWoodruff v. Woodruff, ii Me. 475 (1834); Quinn v. Quinn, 16 Vt. 426 (1844).
i97 Mass. 217, 7 N.E.2d 6oi (1937).
93197 Mass. at 217, 7 N.E.2d at 6oi.
911 Freeman, op. cit. supra note 13, at § 4o7.
9-91 W. Va. 156, 112 S.E. 3oi, 31 A.L.R. 258 (1922).
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relied on the fact that the standard of proof differed as a basis for its
ruling that the judgment should be excluded. Of course, the stand-
ard of proof does differ. But since the conviction is obtained by beyond-
a-reasonable-doubt proof, the defendant is not prejudiced by the in-
troduction of such evidence, for example, in a divorce proceeding,
where the standard of proof is only a preponderance of the evidence,
or, at most, clear, cogent and convincing evidence. If the fact has once
been established beyond a reasonable doubt, the burden of proof in
the divorce case is satisfied and the difference in the degree of the
proof required in the two different types of controversies becomes
unimportant. Then, if the subsequent civil action is between the same
parties, such a criminal judgment would be entitled to a conclusive
effect.96
However, in cases involving the admissibility of judgments of con-
viction based on pleas of not guilty in subsequent divorce actions,
the difference in the parties to the two actions prevents, by present
standards, their use as conclusive determinations. But no court should
deny the admissibility of the judgment as evidence of the disputed
fact in the divorce proceeding. There is no logic in the Massachusetts
rule as expressed in the Silva case. The correct rule is that a judgment
of conviction is admissible as evidence in a divorce proceeding to aid
in establishing the divorce ground, providing the offenses in the two
proceedings are identical.6 7
(4) Acquittals Based on Pleas of Not Guilty. The general exclu-
sionary rule is said to apply to judgments of acquittal. The rule is cor-
rect as to criminal judgments sought to be used in divorce proceedings
as conclusive proof of the disputed facts. In several divorce cases the
courts have held properly that such judgments are not res judicata or
conclusive of the facts determined in the criminal action,98 for the
reason that the parties differ and that the difference in the quantum
of proof in the two actions would result in prejudicing the rights of
the parties to the divorce action. Regarding the difference in the parties,
it has already been noted that either the plaintiff or defendant in the
divorce action will not, ordinarily, have been a party to the prior
1*"2 Freeman, op. cit. supra note 13, at § 657.
OXVald v. Wald, 161 Md. 493, 159 At. 97 (1932); Wilson v. Wilson, Wright
(Ohio) 128 (1832).
c*Mnight v. Knight, 24 A.2d 612 (R.I. 1942); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 1o3 Ore. 208,
204 Pac. 165 (1922); Brower v. Brower, 157 Pa. Super. 426, 43 A.2d 422 (1945); Sanders
v. Sanders, 178 Misc. 720, 36 N.Y.S.2d 287 (1942); Breinig v. Breinig, 26 Pa.
161 (1856). But some courts failed to appreciate the difference between conclusive
and merely evidentiary effect-e.g., Jenkins v. Jenkins, supra; Brower v. Brower, supra.
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criminal proceeding. This would be sufficient to defeat the res judicata
effect of the criminal judgment.99
But what of the difference in the burdens of proof? In cases
involving the use of a judgment of acquittal, it is the divorce re-
spondent who will want to introduce his criminal acquittal in evi-
dence to prove that he is not guilty of the alleged divorce ground. If
the exclusionary rule was created, in part, at least, to protect the de-
fendant-respondent, should it then be used to prevent him from using
the judgment of acquittal to exonerate himself from the charge made
in the divorce proceeding? But the acquittal does not mean that the de-
fendant is innocent of the charge made in the divorce proceeding;
rather, it means that there was not enough evidence to satisfy the re-
quirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In consequence, while
the evidence may be insufficient to prove the defendant guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt, it does not mean that there is not sufficient evi-
dence of a clear, cogent and convincing nature which will satisfy the
trier of fact in the divorce proceeding. 100 Whether or not judgments
of acquittal ought to be admissible as at least some evidence of the
defendant's innocence is a question which can be answered only after
due policy considerations. But it may be doubted that Model Code
rule 52r, providing for their admissibility, is correct on principle.
Acquittals have little, if any, probative value to prove the negative
fact of noncommission of a civil wrong.
C. Effect of Statute.
The admissibility of criminal convictions in divorce proceedings
may be governed by statute. The Pennsylvania statute provides:
"When the respondent in any action of divorce shall have been
convicted and sentenced for adultery, the records of the said
conviction shall be received in evidence on any application
for a divorce by the injured libellant."'1'
This statute, which is restricted to adultery, has been held to cover
only cases of conviction after pleas of guilty or not guilty, and
to leave untouched the law with respect to acquittals. 02 Any judgment
of conviction of adultery,1°3 or an offense which necessarily includes
0See note 94 supra.
'02 Freeman, op. cit. supra note 13, at § 656.101Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 51 (1955). This statute dates back to 1815.
"'-Romano v. Romano, 34 Pa. D.&C. 215, 220 (1939).
mlbid.
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adultery, such as prostitution of a married woman, 04 "while not res
judicata, is not only prima facie evidence, but standing undenied, is
conclusive."105
Whatever one may say about the legislative and judicial restrictions
imposed upon this statute, it constitutes an old affirmance of an old
wisdom, that matrimonial cases are to be regarded as in a class sui
generis.100 This is the point we made at the outset in our plea for a
greater concentration of matrimonial causes, civil and criminal, subject
to a uniform standard of evidence, whatever the rules may be in cases
outside the matrimonial sphere. But we hasten to add that although
matrimonial cases are subject to policy considerations peculiarly
their own and that therefore they should not be set at a par with cases
from other legal problem areas as regards matters of evidence and
otherwise, nothing suggests itself at this point which would prevent
a re-examination of policy considerations on the reciprocal use of
judgments across the board. A common denominator can perhaps be
found which effects our policies better than present text book rules.
V. CONCLUSION
A. Use of Civil Matrimonial Judgments in Criminal Matrimonial
Cases.
Civil judgments, whether or not operating in the defendant's favor,
fully or partially, may be received in evidence as conclusive proof of
(I) the fact of their existence and rendition; and (2) the status of the
parties. They may be received in evidence as tending to prove any
collateral matter not bearing upon the guilt or innocence of the par-
ties.
Provided that the state is, by statute or by common law, a party
to the civil proceedings, as is the case in many states with respect to
divorce proceedings, the identity-of-the-parties requirement of res
judicata has been satisfied. A policy-oriented consideration of the
'1 Provenson v. Provenson, 58 Pa. D.&C. 41, 6o York L. Reg. 105 (1946). Strangely
enough, a plea of guilty to an indictment for fornication, without corroborating
circumstances, was held to be insufficient evidence for divorce on the ground of
adultery. Fornication is subject to fine only, whereas other adultery offenses lead to
possible imprisonment. The possibility of fraud on the divorce court was there-
fore regarded as particularly high in the case of fornication. Chiaretti v. Chiaretti,
24 Pa. D.&C. 679 (1935).
'Romano v. Romano, 34 Pa. D.&C. 215, 233 (1939).
2*3Id. at 217, bringing out that in nonmatrimonial cases Pennsylvania law
holds the "judgment and record of a criminal case ... not admissible in evidence
on the trial of a civil action involving the same matter," citing authorities.
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quantum-of-proof requirement will then lead to the following rule:
Civil judgments, operating fully or partially in the defendant's favor,
may be received in evidence as conclusive proof of the facts on which
they were rendered-e.g., the nonexistence of a divorce ground consti-
tuting the criminal charge.
There may well be sufficient policy considerations leading to the
application of the official-written-statements exception to the hearsay
rule according to which, then, civil judgments operating fully or
partially in the plaintiff's favor may be received in evidence against the
defendant as tending to prove the facts on which they were rendered-
e.g., the existence of a divorce ground.
B. Use of Criminal Matrimonial Judgments in Civil Matrimonial
Cases.0
7
In cases involving the use of criminal judgments in civil matri-
monial proceedings-and contrary to the situation prevailing when
it is sought to use civil judgments in criminal proceedings-there will
always be a lack of identity of the parties (although the quantum
of required proof presents no obstacle) which will prevent the use of
the criminal judgment as conclusive of the disputed facts. Never-
theless, clear policy considerations support their use as evidence, to
be considered together with other evidence, of the facts in issue, ac-
cording to the following rules:
In civil matrimonial proceedings, and apart from statute, judg-
ments of conviction of a matrimonial offense (i) on pleas of nolo con-
tendere are not admissible in evidence as an admission to prove the
commission of the offense, though the nature of this plea does not
prevent the use of the judgment based on the plea as tending to prove
the civil matrimonial issue; (2) on pleas of guilty are admissible in
evidence as tending to prove the commission of the matrimonial of-
fense, under Model Code rule 521, and by the better reasoned cases, as
an admission, and probably also under the official-written-statements
exception to the hearsay rule; (3) on pleas of not guilty are admissible
in evidence as tending to prove the commission of the offense, under
the Model Code rule 521, and by the better reasoned cases, under
official-written-statements exception to the hearsay rule. A re-exami-
1"After completion of this manuscript a valuable student note in a current law
review came to our attention: Note, ii Sw. L.J. 230 (1957). We are in basic agree-
ment with the liberal views there expressed but caution against a hasty adoption
of an overly liberal rule not distinguishing between judgment types according to
plea and disposition, for reasons stated.
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nation of the policy considerations underlying the identity-of-the-
parties requirement of res judicata, however, may well lead to a reform
which would provide for the conclusive effect to be given judgments
of conviction when introduced to prove the identical matter in a
subsequent matrimonial proceeding.
Judgments of acquittal of a matrimonial offense, sought to be in-
troduced in behalf of the defendant in a subsequent civil proceeding
are of greater emotional than legal significance and have little pro-
bative value. It might be queried whether Model Code rule 521 is cor-
rect in providing for their admissibility.
C. Rules in a Family Court.
If and when a family court can be established with jurisdiction
over all causes connected with family breakdown and strife, and em-
powered with a wide range of civil, quasi-criminal and criminal sanc-
tions and remedies, a policy study should be undertaken to determine
whether or not all matters of evidence in such cases, whatever their
nature, should be subjected to a uniform and unfettered policy of ad-
missibility providing for the free reciprocal use of judgments.
19581
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